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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, a corporation,
P lainti f !-Respondent,
vs.
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION
COMP ANY, a corporation, et al.,
Defendants,

• • • • •

OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS &
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD
P. GARR~CK, BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10516

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In order that the court might have a true picture
of the facts in this case, Respondent submits herewith its
statement of facts for the Court's scrutiny.
In November 1959, the owners of an unimproved
tract of land situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
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entered into a real estate contract with Harrison and
Moore, a partnership, for the sale and purchase of the
tract of land for the sum of $8-±,000.00. In said contract
the buyers agreed to develop a subdivision on said land,
the sellers to be under no obligation or expense in connection with the planning, approval and development of
said subdivision. The Agreement further provided for a
conveyance of lots in the subdivision on a lot release
basis and in the event of buyers building houses on the
lots, for subordination of buyers' obligation to the sellers
to the lien of the construction mortgages. (R. 163-168)
Harrison and Moore, in turn, contracted with James
A. Finnegan, Jr., and wife, under date of August 18, 1960.
Finnegans later assigned their interest to Cottonwood
Construction Company, a corporation. (R 169-177)
County approval for Lazy Bar Subdivision was obtained in the latter part of 1960.
From the latter part of 1959 to October of 1960,
Charles D. King surveyed the land, platted it, placed
visible stakes upon the ground, marking the lots, including Lot 10, thus defining the intended subdivision development. (R 69)
Lloyd Jackson and Rex L. Jackson then installed the
roads, curb and gutter, sidewalks, water mains, sewer
mains and sewer laterals. Installation of the sewer mains
and laterals was completed about January 1, 1961 and the
dirt removed from the trenches was replaced and rough
graded. (Note that this took place 22 months before construction of the home started on Lot 10)
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The other off-site improvements were made as stated
in Appellants' Brief.
Application for construction financing on Lot 10 was
made to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and approved. The note and mortgage in the amount of $15,750.00 were executed October 29, 1962 and the mortgage
was recorded the same day.
Contrary to Appellants' contention that there was no
commitment of funds to the account by ~Western, upon receiving the executed note and mortgage, Western immediately assigned both documents to the First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. hereafter referred to as First Security Bank, as security for a loan equal to 80% of the face
amount of the note. First Security Bank then created a
special non-interest bearing account in vVestern's favor,
denominated as a Ban Control Account nnd credited the
same with the sum of $12,600.00, being 80% of the face
amount of the note. A separate Ban Control Account was
created for each lot. Western also maintained its general
checking account with the same bank. After Western
made each disbursement for Lot 10, First Security Bank
would debit the particular Ban Control Account and
credit Vv estern's general checking account with the exact
amount of the disbursement.
Before Cottonwood Construction Company could receive title to Lot 10 and execute a valid first mortgage, a
lot release price o.f $500.00 had to be paid to the fee title
owners. vVestern advanced this sum as a short term loan,
as well as monies for title insurance, hazard insurance
and recording fees on Lot 10 and after the construction
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loan was paid, charged said items against it as an expense. In addition, Western charged against the construction loan its service charge and interest charges as
the same accumulated. Neither the lot release price, nor
any of the other charges just mentioned were reimbursed
from the Ban Control Account. The lot release price and
said charges equaled at least 20% of the face amount of
the note, so that Western, in fact, committed in advance
all of the funds shown in the note and mortgage on Lot 10.
The discretion allowed Western in Schedule "A"
relates only to the amounts and time thereof and not to
the ultimate duty of Western to disburse funds equal to
the face amount of the note.
In the Pre-construction Affidavit, Finnegan and an
associate stated that no work has been started and no
materials furnished for Lot 10.
The mortgage for Lot 10 was recorded prior to the
furnishing of any labor or materials for the building of
the house on said lot.
As shown by its ledger, vVestern attributed advances
to Lot 10 at frequent intervals from October 31, 1962 to
January 24, 1963. (R. 151, Exhibit M-84) At about this
time Western learned that some of the money advanced
to Cottonwood had not been paid to some of the material
suppliers. Western then informed Cottonwood that no
further funds would be advanced on the mortgage until
Cottonwood furnished the balance of properly executed
lien waivers covering all advances to date. This, Cottonwood failed to do.
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Paragraph 10 of the loan agreement provided that
upon default of the borrower, including work stoppage
by the lender under the terms of the agreement, the lender
could, at its option, (1) declare all indebtedness secured
by the mortgage immediately due and payable and be
released from all further obligation to the borrower or
(2) take possession of the premises, finish improvements
and pay the costs thereof out of the funds in the account.
(R. 151, Exhibits W-2) These rights of the lender were
cumulative and not to the prejudice of any other rights
under its mortgage. Respondent wishes to call attention
to the exact language o,f paragraph 10 of the loan agreement which Appellants chose to alter in their statement
of facts. (Appellants' Brief. pp. 7 and 8)
When it became apparent that Cottonwvod had misapplied funds advanced to it by Western, the lien claimants met with Western to determine what course of action
should be taken. Western was urged by Jim Reed, one
of the managers of Boise Cascade, the appellant, to allow
the project to continue by making funds available. It
was agreed by the lien claimants and Western that Cottonwood should convey title to the property to Security
Title Company, as trustee for Western and the lien claimants, and that in order to mitigate the damages, Western
should continue to advance the funds from the mortgage
account to complete the houses which were in various
stages of construction - exposed to the weather, untenantable and subject to acts of vandalism - worthless iil
such condition to serve the purpose for which they were
being constructed. On the strength of this agreement,
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Cottonwood conveyed the property to Security Title ,
Company, as Trustee for vVestern and the lien claimants.
Arlen Fox, secretary of Cottonwood was hired to supervise the work required to finish the houses. The same lien
claimants, suppliers and laborers were used as had been
used from the beginning of the project and Western paid
for all work and materials furnished from the date of
the resumption of work. Negotiations involving the proposed agreement were protracted due to the number of
lien claimants involved and the complexities of the situation. In the meantime, other creditors began to file '
actions against Cottonwood. It soon became apparent to
Western that the only solution to the problem was to
commence foreclosure of the construction mortgages so
this action (and its companion cases) was filed. To further mitigate the damages occasioned by this involved
situation the houses were rented as completed. The house
on Lot 10 was rented in August 1964. It has been occupied
by tenants ever since. The yard has been landscaped, the
value of the house increased, rents have been collected
and are being held by Western pending the disposition of
this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT vV AS CORRE CT IN ACCORDING PRIORITY TO ADVANCES MADE UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION l\IORTGAGE OF WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION IN LIGHT
OF EXISTING STATUTORY AND CASE LAW.
1
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(A) THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT
CREATED THE OBLIGATION OF THE
MORTGAGEE AND ALL AD\'ANCES MADE
THEREUNDER TOOK PRIORITY AS OF
THE TIME OF RmCORDATION OF THE
MORTGAGE. 1
The mortgage transaction in issue had for its purpose the securing of progress payments under a construction loan agreement. This arrangement contemplated
the advancement of funds at various stages of development until the improvements were completed in accordance with settled plans and specifications.

In Utah as in other jurisdictions which favor prior
recorded mortgages over later liens, disbursement of
funds by the mortgagee as the terms of the loan agreement require has been deemed sufficient to confer priority for all such advancements as of the time of recordation of the rnortgage.2
In C1tlmer Paint and Glass Co. v. Gleason, 42 U. 344,
130 Pac. 66 ( 1913) certain mortgages were "given for the
express purpose of raising funds to construct (a) building" and the mortgagee was to

" ... pay out the money as the building progressed .... "
1. Respondent will not depart from the usual and accepted terminology,
viz.: "obligatory or optional" - in presenting its case concerning the
nature of the advances made under its construction mortgage. Suffice
it to say, that the terms emplC!yed by appellants, "volitional or n~n
volitional," are nowhere recogruzed by the case law or commentanes
on this subject, and one can only speCTJ!ate as to why appellants felt
it desirable to by-pass the accepted termmology.
2. Utah Code Anno. 1953, 38-1-5. The prevailing view as to th.e nai1;lre
of construction mortgage advances is noted throughout the discussion
of Point I, but see particularly the authorities at p. 16-24.
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The mortgages were held to take priority over a subsequently arising mechanic's lien to the extent that advances were actually made under the mortgage.
Again in Utah Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Mecham, 11
U. 2d 159, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961), mortgag~s regular in form
which were given to secure funds for the development
of a subdivision were accorded priority over the claims
of materialmen who delivered supplies subsequent to
recordation of the mortgages. This Court stated in response to the argument that no obligation existed to
make the advances :

"A mortgagee who is loaning money to a mortgagor-borrower is obliged to pay out the money in
accordance with the directions of the borrower.
This is especially so where, as in the instant case,
a sum certain is stated in the mortgage and no
provisions are made for future advances."
The appellants do not assert that the Culmer and
Mecham cases were decided erroneously, nor do they dispute the rationale upon which the construction mortgages
in these cases were accorded priority. 3 Ordinarily, therefore, it would seem the appellants could have no valid
3. The equitable basis for priority has frequently been noted, e.g., in
Kiene u. Hodge, 57 N.W. 717, the court stated: "The lots, independent
of the buildings, were not sufficient security for the loan . . . The
equities are strong in favor of the (mortgagees). At the time defendants commenced to furnish the lumber for which their liens are claimed,
the records indicated the lien of the (mortgagees), and they engaged
in the transaction in the full light of the facts."
See also Scholl Priorities Between Mechanic's Liens and Construction
Loan Mortgag~s in Alabama, 23 Ala. Law. 398 (1963): "The theory
behind the statutes in jurisdictions giving priority to the construction
loan mortgagee . . . is that the . . . mortgagee has contributed. ~
much or more to the improvement of the land as have the mecharuc s
lienors. This seems to be a perfectly realistic approach. . . . "
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since the mortgage here was regular in form and clearly
secured typical construction outlays.
However, the appellants would deny such priority
solely on the basis of those provisions of the loan documents governing disbursement of funds. Basically, the
contention is that no obligation existed on the part of the
mortgagee to advance funds because of the right retained
to exercise discretion in making the advancements.
In examining the merit of this contention, the doctrine of future advances as it relates to construction mortgages must necessarily be considered at the outset; thereafter the question of whether the disbursement procedure
adopted here requires a different result will be considered.

NATURE OF CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT
Appellants state the general rule that advances which
the mortgagee is obligated to make will take priority
over intervening liens while optional or voluntary take
priority only as of the time each is made. However, appellants thereafter make no meaningful attempt to differentiate between the different types of security devices
to which the principle is applicable, nor are they at all
helpful on its specific application to construction mortgages.

It is important to note that there are a number of
transactions in which a mortgage may secure future
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advances. 3 a One of the most frequently employed today
is the so-called "optional advance" or "open-end" mortgage. Basically a standard mortgage taken on existing
security, the open-end mortgage contains an additional
clause permitting future advances to be made at the
lender's option. Its usefulness in establishing a continuous line of credit to homeowners for needed repairs,
additions to existing structures, etc. is well knmvn! However, it is clearly distinguishable from the construction
mortgage which is taken no,t on the security of land or
on land and existing improvements but only on the security that improvements will be erected in accordance
with predetermined plans.
The distinction is made quite clear in the very source
appellants have urged the Court to accept as authority
for their argument. Thus at p. 20 of appellants' brief,
the following appears :
"In the third type, the mortgage will provide expressly for the making of future advances, but the
making of these advancements is strictly within
the discretion of the mortgagee. Such a device is
termed a mortgage to secure 'optional future advances.' " Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future
Advances, 21 Mo. L. Rev. 209 (1956).
This statement apparently is intended to be relevent to
the security device, i.e., construction mortgage, now before
the court.
3a. Osborne, for example, lists in addition. to i:onstruction loans, "mortgages by way of indemnity for ~rospEctive mdor~ements; guarantees
and accommodations of commercial paper to be ISsued by the mortgagor; fluctuating current balances under line~ of credit, .established
with th? mortgagee; and security for a bond issue or senes of bond
issues." Osborne, Mortgages §113.
4. 65 Harvard Law Review 478 (1952)
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Actually, the author does no.t end his statement quite as
indicated by the quote. Rather, the latter sentence in full
reads this way:
"Such a device is termed a mortgage to secure
'optional future advances,' bid currently is becoming more familiarly known as am 'open-end
mortgage'." (emphasis supplied)
When the author turns to obligatory advance mortgages and construction financing, he states:
"A typical example of the obligatory form is found
in commercial construction projects where the
lender is contraetually bound to make subsequent
advances to cover the costs as the wo.rk progresses." (p. 219)
This accurately reflects the view the courts have
overwhelmingly adopted with regard to construction
mortgages. That is, the agreement to disburse as construction progresses creates the obligation sufficient to
protect the advances made pursuant thereto.
The Culmer and 111 echam cases so held, and the following are but a few examples of cases in accord:
Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 485,
276 Pac. 971 (1929):
"We think it cannot be questioned, that under the
contract, the mortgagee's obligation was to advance the balance of the funds upon compliance
with the condition of the agreement, viz. : the improvement of the premises. The premises were
improved and the mortgagee became bound by
virtue of the original agreement to advance the
specified sum to pay therefor." (emphasis supplied)
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Landers-Morrison-Christensen Co. v. Ambassador
Holding Co., 214 N.W. 503 (Minn. 1927):
"The contract between the corporation and the
mortgage company imposed upon the company the
duty to procure the necessary funds and make
the stipulated advances as the building progressed. '
It cannot reasonably be construed as crea.ting a ,
mere option to make them. It created an obligation
to make them; and the .advances having been made
pursuant to that obligation they take pri.ority over
the mechanic's lioos." (emphasis supplied)
See also C. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, Calif.
5 P. 2d 669 (1937),Hammond Lumber Co. v. Roubian,
Calif. (1934) 30 P. 2 440, Smith v. Anglo-California, Calif.
(1928), 271. Pac. 898, Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh
Hall Inc., Del. (1930), 152 Atl. 130, Hyman v. Hauff, N.Y.
(1893) 33 N.E. 735, Franklin Svgs & Ln Co. v. Fish, Fla. ,
(1929) 124 So. 42, Micele v. Faldutti, N.J. (1927) 137 Atl
92, Security Stove & Mfg Co. v. Sellards, Kan (1931) 3 P.
2d 484; and see cases collected in Annot. 80 A.L.R. 2d
179, 191, Osborne, Mortgage ~ 120 n. 54.
APPELLANTS' AUTHORITIES

·.

In view of the foregoing, it is instructive to consider
the authorities offered by appellants :5

Superior Lumber Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, •
Ark. (1928) 2 S.W. 2d 1093, Balch v. Chaffee, (1905) 47
Atl. 327, and Carey v. Rufus Lillard Co., Okla. (1945)
165 P. 2d 344, all involve "open-end" mortgages and do
not in any way concern advances under a construction
loan agreement.
5. (See appelant's brief, p. 17.)
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Heller v. Gate City Building and Loan Assoc., 75
N.M. 596, 408 P. 2d 753, a decision which appears to weigh
heavily in the balance with appellants, involves only
the question of the lender's right to include certain costs
of repair under the heading of preservation o.f security.
It, too, contains no discussion or consideration of construction loan advancements. 6
Other cases cited by appellants without further attempt to relate them to the question before the court are:
Finlwyson v. Crooks, Minn (1891) 49 N.W. 398, which
considered the question of priority where the mortgage
was recorded after the commencement of work on the
improvements; Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E.
1093 (1913), involving an arrangement whereby certajn
mortgages were placed on property, but it was expressly
covenanted between the parties that,
" ... they (mortgagor and mortgagee, respectively,) would not demand either the amount agreed
to be loaned, or the amount represented by each
mortgage note or any part thereof. " 8

·.

6. The open-end mortgage may be what the appellants have in mind
in alleging the equitable basis for their contention, viz.: " . . . the
lender could with impunity advance or refuse to advance as it chose,
swallowing up, at its own violition, and for its own benefit, the protection intended the mechanic's lienors." (p. 14, appellants' brief). Where
sums may be advanced on an already existing improvement, as is
typically the case under an open-end mortgage, it is possible for the
mortgagee to attempt to "feed" his security at the expense of lien
claimants by advancing funds after learning of additions or improvements. However, where the security only comes into being as the improvements are made - as is true of construction loans--such an
argument has no relevance or merit, and it is significant that it has
never been given any credence in the cases.
8. The inaptness of the Gray decision is made more graphic when considered in connection with Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass.
94, 100 N.E. 1095 (1913) decided the same day. Here the court was
dealing with priority questions where normal construction progress
payments were involved. Holding such outlays to be prior, the court
stated:
"It is uncontroverted that after deducting interest on the
full amount, the remainder was credited on the books to the
A. W. Sautter Building Account, upon which, as the value of
the property was increased by the construction of the building, the mortgagor was permitted to draw .... It having been
absolutely obligated to pay the loan named. in the mortgage,
it is immaterial that only a very small portion had been thus
transferred before the plaintiffs began work, or that before
the entire amount had been disbursed the company received
notice of the liens." (Emphasis supplied.)
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W. P. Fuller & Co. v. M cClnre, 48 >Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac.
1027 (1920), a case specifically held inapplicable to construction mortgages in a later decision where the court
was faced with the precise claim made by Etppellants here.'
Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 9 P. 2d 324 and Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 w·ash. 2d 29, 116 P. 2d 253,
both of which involved the issue of priority for advances
made after default, and not the issue of whether the
loan agreement provided for optional or obligatory advances; and, finally, Home Savings & Loan Association v.
Sullivan, Okla, 284 Pac. 30 (1929), which is misleading
unless considered in connection with later cases in the
same jurisdiction which cast extreme doubt on its current
validity. 8
With no meaningful qualification offered by appellants to the general view of construction mortgages as
7. See footnote 11, infra.
Sa. The court in the Sullivan case did subordinate the advances made
pursuant to a construction loan agreement on the ground that the
option afforded to the mortgagee to withhold funds until lien claimants
were paid rendered the mortgage one for optional advances. Local
Federal Svgs. & Loan Ass'n. v. Davidson & Case Lumber Co., 255 P.2d
248 (Okla. 1952) and Tul,sa Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Dale Lumber
Co., 381 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1963), have all but rendered this decision
null and of no effect.
In the Davidson case, the loan proceeds were to be disbursed only upon
the owner's showing that parties furnishing labor and materials had
been paid. The court held all advances made under the morgtage to be
entitled to priority over the claims of materialmen; the Sullivan case
was distinguished on the ground that the agreement in !hat case_ g~ve
the mortgagee the option to refrain from payment until the building
had been completed. In the Tul,sa Ready-Mix case, the mortgagee had
the right to pay loan proceeds directly to parties asserting liens against
the property and deduct the amounts thereof from the amoun~ of
the loan. The court was actually unable to distinguish the Sullivan
case but stated that,
". . . in any event, it was made clear in the Davidson case
that the rule stated from C.J.S. (according priority to construction mortgages generally, 57 C.J.S., Mechanic's liens
§205 (b)) would be applied in cases such as this."
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obligatory in form, it remains to consider the contention
that the provisions covering disbursement under the
present loan agreement require a different result.

DISBURSEMENT PROVISIONS
The substance of appellants' contention in this regard
appears at page 11 of their brief, viz.: "Where the lender
is bound to make the advances, he is unable to exercise
discretion.... " Under this view it would follow that a
construction mortgagee in order to achieve priority must
be unilaterally bound to make advancements, regardless
of other factors or conditions which normally qualify any
such duty.
Actually, this is quite inaccurate. Certainly a lender
must be given the opportunity to determine if the payout
is required considering the amount of work completed and
the percentage of the contract already paid.
The exercise of discretion is also required ( 1) where
the work performed or materials furnished are defective
or not in accord with specifications, or (2) where the work
and materials are satisfactory but the owner nonetheless
objects to disbursements on a wholly untenable ground.
The right to withhold or refuse payment in the first instance is self-evident; the following has been noted in
connection with the second:
". . . the authorization to disburse funds, included
in the construction loan agreement, is an essential
protection to the lending institution so that it may
disburse funds at its discretion in the event of any
disputes between owner and contractor wherein
the owner is taking an unreasonable position."
Conway, Mortgage Lending, 340 (1960)
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Thus, the right to exercise discretion in making payouts
may operate as much for the benefit of parties furnishing
labor and materials as for the mortgagee.
Professor Corbin notes other reasons for control over
construction expenditures in discussing the position of the
owner relative to performance by the contractor. It is
apparent that his remarks are equally applicable to a construction mortgagee, viz.:
"In order to get the contract, a bidder may bid
very low; later, in order to avoid loss, or in order
to make his compensatory 'profit' a greater one,
he may 'scamp his job.' There are numberless
ways in which this can be done without discovery
by the other party to the contract. ... A desired
building can perhaps be procured by merely buying
a contractor's promise to build it; a more effective
method, however, is to buy his promise and also to
make the return promise of compensation conditional upon approved performance." (emphasis
supplied) Corbin, Contracts § 650.
This defines the issue clearly: the obligation of the
mortgagee to disburse funds is contingent upon adequate
performance justifying such disbursement. This concept
is basic to construction financing and has been readily
acknowledged in situations such as the present where lien
claimants have sought to avoid a subordinate position by
alleging absence of oblligation to disburse.

Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho
485, 276 Pac. 971 (1929), rejected this contention:
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"
the mortgagee's obligation was to advance
the balance of the funds represented by the mortgage note upon compliance by the mortgagor with
the conditions of the agreement; viz.: the improvement o.f the premises. The premises were improved
and the mortgagee became bound by virtue of the
original agreement to advance the specific sums
to pay therefor." (emphasis supplied)
Again, in Theilen v. Chandler, 9 Tenn. App. (1928), the
court conluded:

"It was not optional with McMillan to refuse to

pay the advancements if the val·ue of the houses
did justify further advancements. For when the
value of the houses justified additional advancements, McMillan's obligation to pay existed. The
obligation to advance became absolute at the execution and registration of the trust deeds, conditioned only upon the time of advancement and the
value of the security." (emphasis supplied)

In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Roubiarn, Calif. (1934) 30 P.
2d 440, the contention of the lien claimants was stated
thus:
"Respondent . . . contends that the entire loan
fund ... constituted an optional advance because
under certain conditions the lender could not be
compelled to advance the money and could stop
payment."
The court's reply goes to the heart of appellants' contention:
"As we understand the cases cited, none of them
are autho·rity for the proposition that where as in
a case like this, the borrower has fully performed
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on his part, the advances to be made under the
agreement are optional with the lender." 9
The right reserved to the mortgagee to use its discretion in making payouts is thus nothing more than a
recognition of an implied condition of the obligation to
disburse; it does not relieve the mortgagee of the obligation to disburse when the condition has been met.
The appellants' quarrel with this conclusion is fairly
summarized by the following excerpt from page 17 of
their brief:
"Since the disbursements are relegated to the 'sole
discretion' of the lender, no legal right inhered
in the borrower to compel disbursement and no
legal penalty could be imposed upon the lender if
in its 'whole' or 'sole' discretion it determined no.t
to disburse."
Basically, then the appellants take this position: The
mortgagee has reserved to itself the right to make disbursements when in its discretion such payouts are required. It may therefore refuse to make any disbursements by alleging that no payouts are warranted, or may
simply decline to advance funds without justifying its
9. The appellants will no doubt assert (as on page 10 of their brief)
that there is no showing that the precise language under consideration
here was present in the above cited cases. Is this really respondent's
burden? It is admitted the transaction in issue is one involving construction financing; the cases cited are of this type, and in addition
considered and rejected the very claim now advanced by appellants.
Is it not incumbent on appellants rather to distinguish these cases on
some more solid ground? For, in view of what has been stated earlier
as to the recognition of the need of a construction lender to exercise
control over expenditures, it seems far more likely than not that language similar to the present was contained in the loan agreements in
the cases cited.
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refusal at all, having always the right to exercise its discretion as it chooses. Thus, there is no obligation to advance funds and the promise of the mortgage to do so is
illusory and unenforcible.
This line of reasoning confuses the right to exercise
discretion with the possibility that di~cretion may be
used arbitrarily. That is, because one party is accorded
the right of approval of performance as a condition to
its own duty to perform, it follo~vs that there is no mutuality of obligation because the possibility exists that the
right may be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. This is
totally at variance with settled rules of construction favoring mutuality of obligation and imposing the condition
of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of the right of discretion.
Mattei v. Hooper, Calif. (1%8) 330 P. 2d 625, notes
the general rule :
"Contracts making the duty of performance of
one of the parties conditional upon his 'satisfaction' are upheld on the theory that the expression
of dissatisfaction must be genuine and not arbitrary, and that an objective criterion-good faith
-controls the right to determine satisfaction."' 0
10. See generally 3 Corbin, Contracts 644-647, 5 Williston, Contracts
§675A (3rd ed.) 1961), 12 Am. Jur., Contracts 895-898, 17 C.J.S., Contracts 1006-1010, Rodriguez v. Barnet, 338 P.2d 907 (1959)
Paley v. Barton Savings and Loan Ass'n., 196 A. 2d 682 (1964), involved a situation where defendant had reserved the right to reject
mortgages under a purchase commitment which failed to receive its
counsel's "approval." Rejecting the argument that no obligation existed, the court stated: "The significant consideration here is whether
or not the parties intended to enter into a binding agreement ... As
stated by Professor Corbin, 'If the parties have concluded a transaction
in which it appears they intent to make a contract, the court should
not frustrate their intention' . . . Thus any terms of the purchase
commitment which were dependent upon defendant's satisfaction
. . . would in the event of a dispute be construed by the court to be
subject to the implied condition that the defendant's decision be reasonable under the circumstances."
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Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P. 2d 302, 19 A.L.R. 2d
1268 (Cal. 1949), provides a helpful example of the rule's
application. Here the matter in issue was a restriction in
a deed against the erection of a dwelling house "until
the plans and specifications with the proposed site therefor have been ... approved" by a named party. It was
contended that the restriction was not binding because,
". . . if the defendant has the right to determine
that a portion of a lot, regardless of its size, is not
suitable for a dwelling, then it could make the same
determination with respect to an entire lot or
group of lots."
The court however determined otherwise, ~tating that this
"result would not follow ... It is clear from what
has been said that the defendant's action must be
reasonable and taken in good faith."
At another point, the court rejected the contention,
" . . . that standing alone the restrictive covenant
requiring approval of plans would leave the purchaser subject to the mere whim of the seller and
would therefore be too indefinite to be enforced
ignores the decisions cited which hold that the
power to approve ... must not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily."
The application of this principle can be easily recognized where the language of construction loan agreements has been in issue. In Weiss, Dreyfous & Seiferth,
Inc v. Natchez Invest. Co., 140 So. 736 (Miss. 1932), e.g.,
the agreement contained the following provision:
1

"If the conditions set forth ... above have been
fulfilled and evidence of such fulfillment has been
furnish~d to the Trustee by written certificate of
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(the architects), then ... such payments shall be
made directly to the contractor . . . provided,
however, that the Trustee shall have the right, but
shall be under no duty to do so, to verify the correctness of any such certificate, and to determine
whether the aggregate amount of the balance due
for work theretofore done thereunder exceeds the
amount then remaining in said trust fund."
Clearly, no qualitative difference exists between the reservation of a right to verify that performance has been
proper, and the right to use discretion in the first instance
to determine if disbursement is proper. The court reached
this conclusion :
"When these laborers' and materialmen's liens
arose the laborers and materialmen had constructive notice that the owner of the building had executed a deed of trust thereon to secure the payment of money to be advanced for the purpose of
paying for the labor and material therefore as the
construction progressed . . . the parties to that
deed of trust contemplated that its lien should be
paramount, anid that the mortg.agee had no option
as to making such advances, but was irrevocably
bound to do so." (emphasis supplied)
In E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 5 P. 2d 669 (Cal.
App. 1931), a construction mortgage was also held to be
one for obligatory advances, notwithstanding that the
mortgagee through its representative obviously retain~d
the right to disburse in its discretion, viz.:
"Appellants further contend that the trial court
erred in granting priority to the deeds of trust,
as the advances made thereunder were optional,
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citing W. P. Fidler & Co. v. McClitre, 191Pac.1027.
The authority cited is not in point. 11 The loan of
$40,000 in the present case was agreed upon a
typical building loan agreement providing that
'said sum of $40,000 shall be advanced in such sum
or smns as your .a•ppraiser or representative shall
reconunend as the work progresses and not otherwise." (emphasis supplied)
This conclusion was reached as to the nature of the agreement:
"The only option given was in the time and amount
of each advancement during the progress of the
work. In the case cited CW. P. Fuller & ·Co.) it was
definitely agreed that the mortgage was in no way
bound to make any advances other than the initial
advance of $1,600, the further advances were
'merely voluntary advances.' "
The facts of the instant transaction call for the same
conclusion. The mortgagee did bind itself to disburse in
accordance with the schedule set forth; however, it had a
right to insist upon adequate performance as a condition
of its obligation; if the performance failed to comply with
the plans and specifications, on the basis of which the
agreement was made, the schedule of payments would inevitably be subject to alteration. But, as noted in E. K.
vVood Lnmber Co. v. Mulhollmnd, supra, an option as to
time and amount of advances does not affect the obligatory nature of the promise; rather it is the undertaking
to pay upon performance that is controlling.
11. It should be noted that the W. P. Fuller Co. decision, a case the
court here found inapplicable to construction loans is one of the prin;
cipal authorities relied upon by appellants. (See page 17, appellants
brief.)
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This result conforms to established rules of construction as well. Notably, that "whenever possible a contract
should be so construed that there are mutually binding
promises on each party. Ross v. Producers Mut. Ins. Co.,
4 U. 2d 396, 295 P. 2d 345. And, perhaps most importantly,
that in determining both the "meaning and legal effect of
an agreement, the transaction should be considered as a
whole." Corbin, Contracts ~ 549, Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37
U. 98, 106 Pac. 9-±5 (1910)
Here the mortgagor wished to undertake certain construction for which a loan was required; the lender agreed
to advance the funds under the terms of an agreement
which contemplated disbursement at various stages of
construction, the security of the lender overall being dependent upon completion of the structure in acco rdance
with plans and specifications. Can it be argued that,
given the terms of such an arrangement, it was intended
one party should not be bound to perform even though
performance by the other fully complied with the conditions of the agreement~ It is certain the purpose of neither
party would be served under such a construction of the
terms, since both the lender's security and the borrower's
hope of profit are wholly dependent upon timely completion of the building.
Caine v. Hagcnbarth, 37 U. 98, 106 Pac. 945 (1910),
states:
0

"vVhere one construction of a contract will make it
unreasonable, unfair or unusual, and another construction equally consistent with the language
thereof, will make it reasonable, fair and just, the
latter construction will prevail."
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Beyond question the appellants, by lifting phrases
out of the context and ref erring them to dictionary definitions rather than to the purpose and meaning of the
transaction as a whole, have endeavored to pin a wholly
unjustified construction upon the loan agreement relative
to its disbursement provisions. r:l'he agreement, when considered in light of the relationship of the parties, the purpose in entering into the arrangement and the goal sought
to be achieved, clearly created mutually binding promises
in accordance with its terms.
(B) THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ACCORDING PRIORITY TO ADVANCES MADE
BY RESPONDEN T TO COMPLETE THE
STRUCTURE FOLLOWING DEFAULT UNDER THE LOAN AGREEMENT. THE RIGHT
OF COMPLETION WAS CONFERRED BY
THE AGREEMENT AND SECURED BY THE
PRIOR MORTGAGE TO THE SAME EXTENT
AS OTHER PROVISIONS. ITS EXERCISE
WAS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES.
1

At the date of abandonment of work on lot 10, the
house was half completed. (See Appellants' Brief P. 26)
The Court can fully appreciate the condition of residential property under these circumstances, it is believed,
without further note.
Cottonwood Construction Company was obligated
under the loan agreement to complete the structure in
accordance with its terms. Respondent was accordingly
bound to make progress payments. Upon the mortgagor's
breach, Respondent was required to determine which
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course of those provided for in the agreement it would
follow. It could have proceeded with foreclosure. Instead,
it chose to complete the structure, employing appellants
among others for that purpose.
Appellants argue that by so doing the nature of the
arrangement was thereby transformed so as to confer a
priority on the lienors to the amounts expended after
default, notwithstanding their subordinate position prior
to that time.
In truth, the loan agreement and all its provisions,
including those which governed the rights of the parties
upon breach, were secured by the mortgage as fully as
was the note. By proceeding to complete the house the
mortgagee simply fulfilled the obligation of the mortgagor through exercise of a right plainly accorded by
the loan agreement.
Appellants in contrast were not parties to the loan
agreement, and it was clearly not executed for their
benefit. Nor, it might be added, did appellants enter into
the transaction with the purpose or even reasonable expectation of achieving priority. They would appear to
have no valid concern therefore with the mortgagee's
rights upon breach of the loan agreement.
This was recognized in Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. Corbett, Calif. 33 P. 2d 41, (1934) where a
lien claimant whom the court specifically found to be
subordinate to a prior construction mortgage questioned
the lender's right to complete the structure following
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abandonment by the mortgagor. The purpose was obviously to assert priority over amounts advanced after default. The court however ruled:
"In view of the oblilgation requiring the money to
be set over for the particular purpose of constructing the building only, and by reason of the obligation on the part of the (mortgagor) to expeditiously proceed to completion, it may not be said
that the respondent erroneously proceeded in the
place of (the mortgagor) to complete the building,
using only such money as was set over for that
purpose by the (mortgagee) to (the mortgagor's)
account. (The mortgagor) would have been powerless to have used the money in question for any
other purpose but the construction of the building.
It may be that (the mortgagor) might question
the (mortgagee's) right to proceed in his stead,
but it does not fallow from this that (lien claimant) also may rm'se this question." (emphasis
supplied)

Bennett v. Worcester County National Bank, -------·
Mass. ________ , 213 N.E. 2d 254 (1966), is a recent illustration
of the fact that courts today will not accept mechanical
application of the theory proposed by appellants, but will
consider the transaction realistically in light of attendant
circumstances. In the Bennett cast>, a construction mortgagee completed a building following default by the mortgagor, and an unsuccessful attempt to sell the uncompleted structure on foreclosure. The construction loan
agreement itself contained basically the same provisions
as that in issue, viz. :
"In the event the contractor fails to complete the
construction of the building within a reasonable
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time, Bamk shall thereupon have the right but
shall not be bound to take immediate possession
of said premises and proceed to complete the
bidding ... and Bank is authorized to charge all
money expended for said completion against any
money not already advanced." (emphasis supplied)
At the time of default, some $133,000 had been advanced
under the construction lo.an agreement. The best offer
received by mortgagee upon advertising the property in
an uncompleted state was $95,000. The mortgagee thereupon expended an additional $60,000 to complete the
structure and it was ultimately sold.
Plaintiffs were junior mortgagees who were clearly
subordinate at the time of default under the construction
mortgage. Their argument to achieve priority in the
sums advanced for completion exactly parallels that of
appellants here, viz:
"The plaintiffs contend that upon (the mortgagor's) breach by failure to complete the building
the bank's obligation to advance money for the
project ceased by the terms of the agreement, the
bank becoming a "volunteer'' as to any sums subsequently advanced and thereby not entitled to
charge them against the foreclosure proceeds ...
Accordingly, the plaintiffs would limit the barnk's
recovery to the $133,608.93 advanced up to the
time of the breach."
The court denied plaintiffs' asserted priority, with the
following observation on the merit of their theory:
"This arcrument ignores the fact that the bank expressly r~served the right to complete the building,
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and that (the mortgagor's) fatilure to complete
violated a covenant, the performance of which was
secured by the mortgage." (emphasis supplied)
The result in Bennett is a realistic appraisal of construction financing. The object and indeed sine qua non
of the entire transaction is erection of the completed
structure. 'The loan agreement is the vehicle adopted by
the parties to accomplish this end, and its provisions,
including those governing rights upon breach, are secured
by the mortgage. An attempt to superimpose a formal
theory of "optional advances" to reverse the priority
contemplated by the parties the court rejected as incompatible with the real objectives of the transaction.
No contention is now made that appellants acted in
other than full awareness of the purposes for which Respondent's mortgage was executed. They should not now
be heard to assert a belated priority based on exercise of
a right secured by that mortgage.

COMPLETION -

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

It must finally be asked what real justification appellants propose for their claim to priority. For not even
appellants, it would appear, are content with bald application of the optional advance concept.

Rather, the justification is said to be in the fact that
at the time o.f breach the lender "was amply protected
by the buffer afforded by the land value." And, in addition, that by "waiting and taking over the venture ... the
lender undertook to enhance its own position at the expense of already disadvantaged lienors."
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This is patently incongruous. A half completed house
is unquestionably less than half a loaf. It is not an adequate "buffer" for a construction mortgagee nor was
it ever so intended; moreover, it would have provided
no security whatever for the suborinate lien claimants.
It has been aptly noted that,
" ... until a building has been completed, its intrinsic value is greatly impaired No one will buy
a lawsuit or an uncompleted structure, except at
a sizeable discount." (Shinehouse, Real Estate
Construction Loan-A Synopsis, 33 Pa. Bar
Ass'n Q. 63 (1961)
The lienors in this situation stood only to benefit from
the mortgagee's willingness to undertake to complete
the house.

It is well settled that advances made for the protection of the security of the mortgage are not optional
but will be treated as obligatory advances entitled to the
priority of the mortgage. This is true even though the
mortgagee is under no obligation to make such advancements by the terms of the mortgage or otherwise. Included under this heading are advances for taxes, insurance, upkeep or repair, or for completion of the improvemen t.12
12. See generally 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages §§316-321; Osborne, Mo~
gages §120; Crofts v. Johnson, Utah, 313 P. 2d 808 (1957); Columbia
Trust Co. v. Farmer's & Merchant's Bank, Utah, 22 P.2d 164 (1933).
An interesting case in this connection is Miller v. Ward, 88 Atl. 400
(Maine 1931), where a mortgagee who had adva~ced funds for .the
erection of an improvement and had taken possess10n of the premises
upon default of the mortgagor was held to have not only the right but
" ... the duty ... having taken possession ... with a house nearly finished but untenantable . . . to protect the interests of the mortgagor
(by) the finishing of the house ... and thereby changing it from unproductive property to income producing property."
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The same conclusion has been readlPd not\\-ithstanding that the rights of a junior liPnhoMic'r \nre im-olwd.
In Logan-Moore Lumber Co. v. Bour:r.sock, 100 Kansas
328 ( 1917) 16-± Pae. 156, the owner abandoned the construction of several houses under agreem0nts whieh called
for the expenditure of approximately $2,300 for completion. At the time of abandonment, the improvements
were estimated to be \vorth from $500 to $SOO. The mortgagee thereupon completed the buiklings according to
plans, with the exception of a few minor additions. His
right to priority for all amounts expended (except only
the additions just noted) was upheld over the claim of
a lienholder who had furnished certain materials prior
to the breach. Although the question \\-as considered of
whether the lienholder was barred by a \rniver of lien
executed sometime earlier, it is clear the court did not
treat it as germane to the issue of priority for swns expended after breach. Rather, the matter of priority for
these sums is considered on its own merits, and it is believed the court's conclusions are instructive as to the
validity of the position taken by appellants here, viz.:
" ... As (the mortgagor) had abandoned the property with the buildings inrornplete and in such
condition as to deteriorate rapidly, unless something were done to preserve them, it was natural
and proper that (the mortgagee) should assume
control and take steps to that end ... Here, before
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(the mortgagee) began work upon the completion
of the buildings, he had a first lien for $2, 700. The
two lots were worth but $2,500. The (lienholder's)
second lien was therefore practically worthless as
things stood. The only reasonable prospect of its
realizing anything upon its claim was through the
investment by someone of enough more money to
give added value to what had a.Zready been done.
The mere covering in of the incomplete buildings
so as to protect them from the weather would not
have accomplished this, nor have appreciably bettered the (lienholder's) condition. The natural and
reasonable metho,d of increasing the value of the
pairtially constructed bu.ildings was to complete
them according to the original design. Under the
peculiar circumstances presented we think the
trial court was justified in giving (the mortgagee)
a first lien for money expended in this way." (emphasis supplied)
In view of the state of construction in the case before
the court, it would appear the rationale of Logan-Moore
Lumber Company v. Bowersock will apply.
Elmendorf-Anthony v. Dunn cited by Appellants in
support of their argument really bears little relevance
to this situation since in that case the mortgagee had
disbursed all but $49.00 of a $2200.00 loan at the time of
the breach.
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Overall, it is apparent the provision in question here
is a common, even standard, clause in construction financing arrangements. 13 Its presence is directly attributable
to. the prime object of the transaction - completion of
the structure according to plans. The foregoing discussion, it is believed, demonstrates that the courts are not
prepared to accept appellants' proposal to apply the
optional advance concept in a rigid, mechanical fashion.
They will, however, interpret the concept reasonably in
light of the circumstances and refuse to apply it when
obviously incompatible with the objectives of the transaction involved.

POINT IL
•THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY THE
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT CONS'l1ITUTE
"COMMENCEMENT TO DO WORK OR FURNISH
M.A:TERIALS ON THE GROUND FOR THE STRUCTURE OR IMPROVEMENT" WITHIN THE MEANING OF 38-1-5 UCA (1953).
13. The Building Loan Agreement of the Federal Housing Administration (form No. 2441) contains similar provisions. Paragraph 10 of
said Building Loan Agreement contains the following language:
"If the borrower at any time prior to the completion of the
project abandons the same or ceases work thereon for a period
of more than 20 days or fails to complete the erection of th.e
project strictly in accordance with the drawings and specifications ... or otherwise fails to comply with the terms hereof, any such failure shall be a default he!eunder._ at the
option of the lender, and the lender may termmate this agreement, or the lender, at its option, at any time thereafter may
enter into possession of the premises and perform any and
all work and labor necessary to complete the improvements
substantially according to drawings and specifications, and
employ a watchman to protect the premises from injury, all
sums so expended by lender to be deemed paid to borrower
and secured by said mortgage."
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(A) THE PRIORITY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE IS CONTINGENT UPON 'THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF WORK OR FURNISHING OF MATERIALS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL BUILDINGS OR SiTRUCTURES AGAINST WHICH
SUCH L,IENS ARE CLAIMED. IN ORDER TO
SERVE AS BASIS FOR PRIORITY OVER
OTHER ENCUMBRANCES THE INITIAL
WORK MUST BE SUCH AS TO PROVIDE
CLEAR AND VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILDING ITSELF. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS, SUCH
AS THE PREPARATION OF A SURVEY, OR
THE CONS1TRUCTION OF OFF-SITE IMPROVEMENTS DO NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.
Priority among mechanics' lien claimants, mortgagees and other encumbrancers is governed by ~ 38-1-5,

U.C.A. (1953), which, in relevant part, provides that liens
of the first mentioned group,
"shall relate back, and take effect as of the time
of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have
attached subsequently to the time when the building improvement or structure was commenced,
wo;k begun, or first material furnished on the
ground." (emphasis added)
The language of 38-1-5 suggests three conditions
which must be satisfied before a lien claim may take priority over a record mortgage:
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(1) work on the building, structure or improvement, or initial furnishing of materials must
precede recordation of the mortgage;
(2) the initial work or furnishing of materials
must be on the ground or site upon which the
building is being erected; and
(3) the initial work or furnishing of materials
must be for the building proposed to be constructed, and hence clearly recognizable as
the beginning of such construction.
'The first of these conditions is clearly acknowledged
m Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12
Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d 598 (1961), where, in discussing
the rival claims of certain mechanic lienors and a mortgagee, the court states :
"Our law provides that a properly recorded mortgage has priority over a mechanic's lien for work
or labor furnished but which has commenced after
the recordation of the mortgage."
The plain meaning of the statute establishes the second condition. Thus 38-1-5 provides that the liens "relate
back to ... the time when the building, improvement or
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material
furnished on the groitnd." This latter phrase qualifies
each of the preceding events and obviously requires that
the initial performance take place on the site of the
contemplated construction.
1

As to the third, the terms of the act provide that
priority is contingent upon the "commencement to do
work or furnish materials ... for the strncture or im-

provement."
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The general rule as to what constitutes the commencement of wo.rk on a building is contained in 57
Corpus Juris Secundum, Mechanic's Liens, P. 179.
"The commencement of the building or improvement within the meaning of mechanic's liens statutes is the visible commencement of actual operations on the ground for the erection of the building, the doing of some wo.rk or labor on the ground,
such as beginning to excavate for the foundation,
or work of like description which every one can
readily see and recognize as the commencement
of a building, and which is done with the intention
and purpose then formed to continue the work
until the completion of the building."
"On the other hand, work which, although it may
improve the property, is merely preparatory to
building operations at some future time, and does
not of itself tend to contribute directly to the erection, such as clearing, leveling, filling up, or f encing the property ... does not constitute a commencement for the purpose of fixing the time to
which the lien relates. Also staking out the plan
of the building or the boundary line of the tract,
does not constitute a commencement of the building within the meaning of the lien statutes."
See, also, Jones, Liens~ 1469, 1474.
UTAH DECISIONS
The relevant decisions in this jurisdiction are in
accord with the general view requiring for priority purposes, the initial performance of work or furnishing of
materials to be made in connection with, and provide
clear evidence of the commencement of, the building or
improvement sought to be liened. In Teahen v. Nelson, 6
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U. 363, 23P. 764, for example, the court stated the following in commenting on an earlier version of 38-1-5, viz.:
"Section 3810 of the same chapter prefers the
lien given in the chapter to any other that may
have attached or been created subsequent to the
time when the building, improvement or structure
was commenced; also to any such lien of which the
lienholder had no notice, and which was unrecorded at the time the building was commenced.
This section requires other lienholders, by mortgage, or otherwise, to take notice of the commencement of work on the building." (emphasis
supplied)

In Stanton Transportation Company v. Davis, 9 U.
2d 184, 341 P. 2d 207, (1959) an action foreclosing liens in
connection with services and materials used for an oil well
drilling rig, the Utah Supreme Court was called upon
to decide the time at which a lien for labor or materials
should attach as well as exactly "What materials or services are lienable items under the statutes. The court
granted a lien for labor in erecting the drilling rig on
the wellsite but rejected the lien claim for labor and expenses in transporting the drilling rig to the wellsite. The
relevant language of the court follows:
"The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect
those who have added directly to the value of
property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon it. (Emphasis supplied)
'The court further said:
"The lien given to contractors and laborers specified the "performing labor upon, or furnishing
materials to be used in ... or repair ... building
... or improvement upon (the) land." If the more
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general phrase "or in concerning which'' were
controlling as to that class of lien claimants, the
specific language requiring the work or materials
to be upon the property would be idle verbiage .
. . . (2, 3) While it is true that our statutes are
to be liberally construed to give effect to their
purpose and to promote justice it is equally true
that they should not be distorted beyond the intent
of the legislature. This principle is particularly
applicable in a situation of this kind where a
liability is imposed upon the property owner beyond what he contracted to bear for the improvement of his property. In order to impose upon
him such additional burdens the law must clearly
spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the entering into a contract for the improvement of one's
property might open the door to lmforeseeable
risks for the property owner. He is aware of the
amount of work to be done upon his property and
fairly may be charged with knowledge of the extent thereof. But that is not true of peripheral
work that may be in some remote way related to
the contractor's activities.
Also, Morrison v. Carey Lombard Co. 9 U, 33 P 238,
(1893) Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Partridge, 10 U.
332, 37 P. 572, (1894) and Morrison v. Inter-Mountain
Salt Co. 14 U. 201, 46 P. 1104 (1896) where the attachment of liens is clearly made dependent upon the furnishing of work and materials for the bitilding or improvement.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Generally, work of a preliminary nature and not
directly involved in commencement of the structure itself
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has been rejected as the date for the attachment of claims
of parties performing labor or furnishing materials subsequent to the recording of a mortgage on the property.

North Shaker Boulevard Co. v. Harriman Nat. Bank,
153 N.E. 909 (Ohio Ct. A. 1926) is an instance. Here
certain materialmen who had furnished supplies to the
premises sought to achieve priority over a prior mortgage on the theory that "work, construction, or improvement" had been commenced on the property prior to the
recording o.f the mortgage. This contention was based on
the presence on the property of steamshovels, the location
of test holes, the driving of stakes, and other work of a
similar nature prior to the recording of the mortgage.
Rejecting the claim of the materialmen for priority, the
court states the following as the test to be applied in the
determination of whether work had been commenced as
contemplated by the statute:
" ... was the work, improvement, or construction
of such a nature that apparently, obviously and
visibly it formed in and of itself a component part
of the structure, so that when the structure arose
from the ground the work, improvement, or construction commenced prior to the mortgage would
appear as part of the structure itself, as a physical
identity, which, speaking in its own behalf, would
indicate the situation prior to the recording of the
recording of the mortgage 1"

Rupp v. Cline & Sons, Inc. 188 A. 2d 146 (Md. 1963)
is the most recent expression on the subject. A Lien claimant sought priority in the proceeds of a foreclosure sale
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under a deed of trust which had been recorded approximately four months after the claimant had graded the
mortgaged land, but before the claimant began actual
excavation for a proposed apartment development.
The Maryland mechanics lien statute is similar to
the Utah Statute in providing that the lien conferred
takes priority over mortgages and other encumbrances
which "attach upon the said building or the ground covered thereby subsequent to the commencement thereof
... " In determining that the initial work done by the
claimant did not fix the time to which liens could relate,
the Court made these observations:
" ... before there can be the commencement of a
building which would give a mechanic's lien claimant a preference over a recorded mortgage there
must be (1) a manifest commencement of some
work or labor on the ground which overyone can
readily see and recognize as the conunencement
of a building and ( 2) the work done must have
been begun with the intention and purpose then
formed to continue the work until the completion
of the building."
Finding these elements absent in the instant case, it was
concluded that while:
" ... the removal of soil had the effect of leveling
the apartment site, that fact did not constitute
commencement for the purpose of fixing the time
to which a lien could relate ... nor did the grading
or leveling - since there was no work on the
ground which everyone could readil_Y ~ee and recognize as the commencement of a bmldmg - have
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the effect of putting the party making the construction loan on notice that the building had been
commenced ... "
The lien claimants are unable to meet either of these
tests. Neither the work of surveying or construction of
roads and sidewalks, water mains, sewer mains and laterals or utility poles can be considered sufficient to give
notice of proposed construction on the individual lots.
In addition, it is obvious there was not the necessary
continuity between the initial operations - the survey
was made in early 1960, the roads, sidewalks, water mains,
sewer mains and laterals were not constructed until over
a year had elapsed and initial construction on the home
did not begin for another eighteen months thereafter to show the "intention and purpose then formed to continue the (preliminary) work until the completion of
the building."
(See also Fryman v. McGhee, 163 N.E. 2d 63 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958); Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Building Co.
101 N.E. 2d 408 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Erickson v. Ireland, 158 N.W. 918 (Minn. 1916); Central Trust Co. v.
Cameron Iron & Goal Co. 47 Fed. 136 (Cir. W.D. Pa.
1891); Kiene v. Hodge, 57 N.vV. 717 (Ia. 1894) Puseig &
Jones v. Pa. Paper Mills, 173 Fed. 634 (1909); W·aird v.
Vannelle, 91 N.E. 7)
(B) WHE!THER THE PRELIMINARY WORK IS
ITSELF LIENABLE UNDER THE STATUTE
HAS NO RELEVANCY TO THE QUE8TION
OF PRIORITY BE:TWEEN THE MORTGAGEES AND THE LIEN CLAIMANTS. THE
ISSUE OF PRIORITY IS, RATHER, CONTINGENT SOLELY UPON THE DE TERMINATION OF WHETHER ACTS OCCURRED ON
1
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THE PREMISES SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE
CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL HOUSE PRIOR
TO REICORDATION OF THE MORTGAGES.
Priority between mechanics and materialmen on the
one hand and a mortgagee on the other is a matter entirely distinct from the question of what is or is not lienable under the statute.

Erickson v. Ireland. 158 N.W. 918 (Minn. 1916)
points up the distinction sharply. The lien claimants here
sought to relate their claims back to the time of the
architect's preparation of plans. The work done by the
architect had predated recordation of a construction
mortgage on the premises, while the work and materials
furnished by the lien claimants had post-dated such recording. The relevant statute contained this language:
1

"All such liens as against the owner of the land
shall attach and take effect from the time the
first item of material or labor is furnished upon
the premises for the beginning of the improve.ment, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or
other incumbrance not then of record unless the
lienholder had actual notice thereof."•

An earlier case, Lamoreaux v. Andersch, 150 N.W.
908 Minn. (1915) established the right of an architect to
*Another clause of this provision reads as follows:
"As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee or incumbrancer
without notice, however, no lien shall attach prior to the actual
and visible beginning of the im~rovemi;nt on. !he g~ound."
The court found it unnecessary to consider this provision, smce, for the
purpose of answering the argument of the lien claimants, it accepted
their assertion that the mortgagee had notice and thus was in the
same position as the owner. It will be noted that the statutory language
considered by the court is basically the language of 38-1-5, U.C.A.
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a lien on the property, regardless of whether the improwment for which his services were required ·was completed.
The court in the instant case noted the lien claimants' reliance on this decision in stating the issue as follows:

"It is contended that as a result of the decision in
the Andersch Case all liens must be held to attach
as against the owner and mortgagees with notice
claiming under him as of the time the architect
commenced to prepare his plans."
This argument was flatly rejected:
"It was not held in the Andersch Case that where

a building is actually constructed, liens attach as
against the mvner of the land as of the time the
architect commences the preparation of his plans.
·we cannot so hold here. The statute does not admit
of such construction.
"The language of the statute, when applied to a
case where a building is actually constructed is
not doubtful. In plain terms it says that:
'All .... liens .... attach and take effect
from the time the first item of material
or labor is furnished upon the premises
for the beginning of the improvement.'
"If anything more need be said, we might say
that the provision that mechanics' liens should be
preferred to any mortgage or other incumbrance,
not of record at the time of furnishing such first
item of material or labor unless the lienholder
had actual notice thereof, leads to the inference
that it was intended that such liens were not to
be preferred to any mortgage which was th~n. of
record ... it was not the intent of the decision
to throw doubt on the meaning of this langua~e
as applied to the usual case where improvement is
made on the ground.
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"\Ve hold that when a building is erected all liens
attach at the time the first item of material or
labor is furnished on the ground. The result is
that the mortgage is prio.r to the liens." (emphasis
added)
Rupp v. Cline & Sons, Inc. Supra, is another case in
point.
Thus, regardless o.f whether a lien can be asserted
for the work done or materials furnished, the question
of priority remains dependent upon the same factors,
namely, the performance of acts on th~ premises sufficient to give notice of the commencement of the building.

National Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, Inc., 87 N.W.
2d 32 (Minn. 1957) also contains a clear acknowledgment
of the distinction between lienability of services or materials furnished and the right to priority. In determining that the erection of a fence on the premises before a
mortgage was recorded did not confer priority on parties
iierforming labor or furnishing materials for the construction of a building subsequent to the recordation, the
court made this analysis :
"Appellants' first contention is that the fence
constituted an actual visible improvement upon
(the) premises. Of this there can be no doubt. Nor
can there be any doubt that the case of the fence
would have been a lienable item if the bill ... had
not been paid ... It is not important that the company which provided the fence later furnished
materials in the construction of the dwelling for
it need only be demonstrated that the fence constituted "the actual and visible beginning of the
improvement on the ground' in order for the lien
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to attach. When a building is erected all liens at.
tach at the time the first item of material or labor
is furnished on the ground."
After considering several Minnesota cases dealing
with the doctrine of "relation back" for purposes of
priority under the mechanic's lien statute, the court concluded:
" . . it appears that the line of distinction is
whether or not the improvement bears directly on
the construction of the building rather than whether it is part of the overall project involved."
In this light the court affirmed the finding below
that "the fencing was not the beginning of the improvement within the meaning of (the statute) ... and that
the erection of the fence was severable and separable from
the later work."
·The same reasoning is applicable to the facts at hand.
First, the initial platting of the subdivision and the con·
struction of roads and other "off-site" improvements,
did not constitute the "commencement" of the building,
and, second, even though such work is deemed to be lien
able and part of the overall work on the subdivision, it
is clearly "separate and severable" from actual construe·
tion of the individual lots.
Appellants have relied on the case of United States
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Finance Corp. SG
U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090 ( 1935) and cases cited therein to
support their position. It is true that the Midvale Home
Finance Corp. case did involve a contest for priority
between Mechanic's lien claimants and the mortgagee. Jn
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that case, however, both the lien claimants and the mortgage\~ asserted liens against the entire subdivsion, rather
than against individual lots. The question of preliminary
work or off-site improvements as a basis for the attachment of lien claims is not mentioned in the case. Rather,
it is apparent that actual construction of the homes was
commenced before the mortgage was recorded and the
lien claimants were engaged in such construction from
the out-set. Thus, the Court in MIDVALE was faced
simply with a situation where the visible beginnings of
construction on the subdivision improvements were commenced prior to the recordation of the mortgage, and both
lien claimants and mortgagee looked to the tract as a
whole for their security. In the case before the Court,
the parties have looked to the individual lots for security,
individual mortgages having been recorded on each lot
and notices of lien filed by lien claimants on individual
lots. Thus, the lien claims must be evaluated separately
as to each residence. The Midvale holding would require
here, as in the case of liens asserted against the entire
subdivision, that actual construction on the improvements
on the individual lots precede recordation of the mortgage.

SUMMARY
If mechanics liens are to prevail over the lien of a
recorded mortgage, the commencement of work or furnishing of materials must both precede the recordation
of a mortgage and provide clear evidence of the beginnings of the erection of the building itself. Preliminary
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and offsite operations such as were involved here are
wholly insufficient to satisfy this requirement. The fact
that the preliminary work may itself be lienable under
the statute is of no consequence on the question of priority, in the absence of an adequate showing that the work
in fact constituted the commencement of the building
sought to be liened.
By the record before the Court it is clear that none
of the lien claimants furnished labor or material upon
Lot 10, for the home upon the lot until the mortgage in
favor of Respondent had been recorded.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument advanced by the lien claimants would in the normal case,
preclude a mortgagee from achieving priority over the
liens of parties subsequently furnishing labor or materials for the construction of improvements, since work
in the form of a survey or the construction of roads and
sidewalks nearly always precedes actual construction of
the building. This result is manifestly contrary to the
intention of the parties, and is appropriately avoided by
the statute and relevent case law which uniformly require
the initial work to provide suitable evidence of the commencement of the building itself. The language of Sec.
38-1-10, placing all liens upon an equal footing does not
alter the fact that this requirement must be met before
any liens will attach to the individual lots.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing argument, respondent
respectfully prays that this Court affirm the trial court's
interlocutory order appealed from:
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By determining that the advances made by respondent under the construction mortgage were obligatory and took priority as of the date of recording the
mortgage.
1.

2. By determining that the advances made by respondent to complete the house on Lot 10 following default were made pursuant to the loan agreement and
took priority as of the date of recording the mortgage.
3. By determining that the facts submitted by the
affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment did not constitute "commencement to do work or
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvements" within the meaning of 38-lc- 5 Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953)
4.

Awarding to respondent its costs incurred herein.
Respectfully submitted,
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